In exasperation, Callicles joins the fray. He cannot believe that Socrates seriously holds these revolutionary views. Socrates replies, in metaphorical language, that he is certainly voicing his inner convictions- and contrasts this with the worldly Callicles’ obligation ligation to voice only what accords with the changing whims of the populace. Callicles locates Polus' mistake as conceding that doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering it. He claims that this vine is merely a convention designed by the weak to suppress the strong and argues that might is right, by natural law. Socrates aberrant views, he claims, are due to overindulgence in intellectual pursuits rather than worldly experience. Callicles ends his long and famous speech with a prophetic warning that if Socrates ever finds himself in court, his impracticality will leave him incapable of defending himself
CALLICLES: Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates serious or is he having us on?
CHAEREPHON: I think he's perfectly serious, but there's nothing like asking the man himself
CALLICLES: All right, I'd certainly love to do that. Socrates, may I ask you a question? Are we to take it that you're serious in all this, or are you having us on? You see, if you’re serious, and if what you’re saying really is the truth, surely human life would be turned upside down, wouldn’t it? Everything we do is the opposite of what you imply we should be doing.
SOCRATES: .
CALLELES: Spoken like a true popular orator, I'd say, Socrates! All that passion! But it's only because what's happened to Polus is exactly what happened to Gorgias and Polus told Gorgias off for letting you manipulate him into that situation. You asked Gorgias whether he’d teach morality to a hypothetical pupil of his who had come to learn rhetoric and didn't d already know what was right and what was wrong; and Gorgias, according to Polus, was embarrassed into saying that he would, because people would typically be offended if anyone said that he couldn't teach it. It was as a result of this concession that he was forced to contradict himself, and Polus went on to point out that this is exactly the situation you relish. He was mocking you then, and I think he was right to do so, but now it's his turn: exactly the same thing has happened to him! To be specific, where I think Polus was at fault was in agreeing with you that doing wrong is more contemptible than suffering wrong. It was this admission of his which enabled you to tie him up in logical knots and muzzle him; he was just too embarrassed to voice his convictions. You pretend that truth is your goal, Socrates, but in actual fact you steer discussions towards this kind of ethical idea-ideas which are unsophisticated enough to have popular appeal, and which depend entirely on convention, not on nature. They're invariably opposed to each other, you know nature and convention, I mean- and consequently if someone is too embarrassed to go right ahead and voice his convictions, he's bound to contradict himself. This in fact is the source of the clever, but unfair, argumentative trick you've devised: if a person is talking from a conventional standpoint, you slip in a question which which presupposes a natural point of view, and if he's talking about nature, you substitute convention. On this matter of doing and suffering wrong, for instance to take the case at hand-Polus was talking about what was more contemptible from a conventional standpoint, but you adopted the standpoint of nature in following up what he said, because in nature everything is more contemptible if it is also worse (as suffering wrong is), whereas convention ordains that doing wrong is more contemptible. In fact, this thing-being wronged -isn't within a real man's experience, it's something which happens to slaves, who'd who'd be better off dead, because they're incapable of defending themselves or anyone else they care for against unjust treatment and abuse.
In my opinion it's the weaklings who constitute the majority of the human race who make the rules. In making these rules, they look after themselves and their own interest, and that's also the criterion they use when they dispense praise and criticism. They try to cow the stronger ones- which is to say, the ones who are capable of increasing their share of things- and to stop them getting an increased share, by saying that to do so is wrong and contemptible and by defining injustice in precisely those terms, as the attempt to have more than others. In my opinion, it's because they're second-rate that they're happy for things to be distributed equally. Anyway, that's why convention states that the attempt to have a share than most people is immoral and contemptible; that’s why people call it doing wrong. But I think we only have to look at nature to find evidence that it right for better to have greater share than worse, more capable than less capable. The evidence for this is widespread. Other creatures show, as do human communities and nations, that right has been determined as follows: the superior person shall dominate the inferior person and have more than him. By what right, for instance, did Xerxes make war on Greece or his father on Scythia, not to mention countless further cases of the same kind of behavior? These people act, surely, in conformity with the natural essence of right and, yes, I'd even go so far as to say that they act in conformity with natural law, even though they presumably contravene our man-made laws.
What do we do with the best and strongest among us? We capture them young, like lions, mold them, and turn them into slaves by chanting spells and incantations over them which insist that they have to be equal to others and that equality is admirable and right. But I'm sure that if a man is born in whom nature is strong enough, he'll shake off all these limitations, shatter them to pieces, and win his freedom, he'll trample all our regulations, charms, spells, and unnatural laws into the dust; this slave will rise up and reveal himself as our master, and then natural bright will blaze forth. I think Pindar is making the same point as me in the poem where he says, 'Law, lord of all, both gods and men...’ And law, he continues, ‘instigates extreme violence with a high hand and calls it right. Heracles' deeds are proof of this, since without paying for them...’ Something like that- I don't know the actual words, but he says that Heracles drove off Geryon's cattle without paying for them and without Geryon giving them to him, presumably because it was natural justice for him to do so, in the sense that all the belongings of worse, inferior people not just their cattle are the property of a man who is better and superior. These are the facts of the matter, and you'd appreciate the truth of what I've been saying if only you'd forget about philosophy at last and turn to more important things. The point is, Socrates, it's fine for a person to dabble when he’s the right age for it, but it ruins him if he devotes too much of his life to it. Even a naturally gifted person who continues to study philosophy far into life is bound to end up without the experience to have gained the accomplishments he ought to have if he's to be a gentleman with some standing in society. In actual fact, philosophers don't understand their community's legal system, or how to address rather political or private meetings, or what kinds of things people enjoy and desire. In short, they're completely out of touch with human nature. When they do turn to practical activity, then, in either a private or a political capacity, they make ridiculous fools of themselves-just as, I imagine, politicians make fools of themselves when they're faced with your lot's discussions and ideas. In other words, Euripides was right when he said, 'A person shines at, and expends his energy on, and devotes most of his waking hours to, the activity at which he happens to excel. He shuns and reviles anything he's no good at, and sings the praises of his own specialty in a self-regarding way, because he thinks this will increase his own prestige.
It seems to me that the optimum course is to have a foot in both camps. A certain amount of philosophy helps one to become a cultured person, and it's fine to take it that far; there's nothing wrong with studying philosophy in one’s teens. But it's a ridiculous thing for a person still to be studying philosophy even later in life, Socrates. I feel the same way about doing philosophy as I do about stammering and playfulness. I enjoy seeing a child stammer and play games when he's still young enough for this kind of behavior to be expected from him, it's pleasantly unaffected, I think, and appropriate to the child's age. When I hear a young child coming out with fluent sentences, however, it seems harsh, grates on my ears, and strikes me as degrading somehow. On the other hand, the phenomenon of a grown man stammering or playing childish games seems ridiculous and immature, and you want to give him a good thrashing.
That's how I feel about people who do philosophy as well. I don't mind seeing a young lad take up philosophy: it seems perfectly appropriate. It shows an open mind, I think, whereas neglect of philosophy at this age signifies pettiness and condemns a man to a low estimation the of his own worth and potential. On other hand, when I see an older man who hasn't dropped philosophy, but is still practicing it, Socrates, I think it is he who deserves a thrashing. You see, I said a moment ago, under these circumstances even a naturally gifted person isn't going to develop into a real man, because he's avoiding the heart of his community and the thick of the agora, which are the places where, as Homer tells us, a man 'earns distinction’. Instead he spends the rest of his life sunk out of sight, whispering in a corner with three or four young men, rather than giving open expression to important and significant ideas.
I’m quite fond of you, Socrates, and that's why I react to you in the same way, as it happens, that Euripides had Zethus (whose words I quoted a moment ago) react to Amphion. I'm moved to copy Zethus talking to his brother, and say: 'Socrates, you're neglecting matters you shouldn't neglect. Look the noble temperament at with which nature has endowed you! Yet what you're famous for is behaving like a teenager. You couldn't deliver a proper speech to the councils which administer justice, ro make a plausible and persuasive appeal, or put passion into a proposal designed to help someone else. And yes, my dear Socrates-now, please don't get cross: it’s because I'm fond of you that I'm going to say this- isn't this state an embarrassment for you and anyone else who keeps going deeper and deeper into philosophy? The point is that if you or any of your sort were seized and taken away to prison, unjustly accused of some crime, you'd be incapable-as I'm sure you're well aware- of doing anything for yourself. With your head spinning and mouth gaping open, you wouldn't know what to say. And if, when you appeared in court, you were faced with a corrupt and unprincipled prosecutor, you'd end up dead, if it was the death penalty he wanted. Oh, Socrates, 'What a clever discovery this is! It enables you to take a naturally gifted person and ruin him." It makes a person incapable of defending himself or of rescuing himself or anyone else from terrible danger, the best he can hope for is that his enemies will steal all his property and let him live on in his community with no status whatsoever, which would make his situation such that anyone could smash him in the face (if you'll pardon the extravagant expression) and not be punished for it.
No, Socrates, please take my advice and stop your cross-examinations; practice the culture of worldly affairs instead, and take up the kind of occupation which 'will make your wisdom famous, and leave to others the subtle route' of spouting drivel or rubbish- these are the right kinds of terms for it-'which leaves you living in a deserted house’. Don't model your behavior on these quibblers, but on people who make a living and earn a great many benefits for themselves, not the least of which is prestige.
Yo joe!